Mean Field Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) Games of Forward-Backward
  Stochastic Differential Equations by Huang, Jianhui et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
31
1.
18
76
v2
  [
ma
th.
OC
]  
17
 M
ar 
20
14
Mean Field Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) Games of
Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations∗
Jianhui Huang† Shujun Wang† Hua Xiao‡
August 18, 2018
Abstract
This paper studies a new class of dynamic optimization problems of large-population (LP) system
which consists of a large number of negligible and coupled agents. The most significant feature in
our setup is the dynamics of individual agents follow the forward-backward stochastic differential
equations (FBSDEs) in which the forward and backward states are coupled at the terminal time.
This current paper is hence different to most existing large-population literature where the individual
states are typically modeled by the SDEs including the forward state only. The associated mean-field
linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) game, in its forward-backward sense, is also formulated to seek the
decentralized strategies. Unlike the forward case, the consistency conditions of our forward-backward
mean-field games involve six Riccati and force rate equations. Moreover, their initial and terminal
conditions are mixed thus some special decoupling technique is applied here. We also verify the
ǫ-Nash equilibrium property of the derived decentralized strategies. To this end, some estimates
to backward stochastic system are employed. In addition, due to the adaptiveness requirement to
forward-backward system, our arguments here are not parallel to those in its forward case.
Key words: Decentralized control, ǫ-Nash equilibrium, Forward-backward stochastic differential
equation (FBSDE), Large-population system, Mean-field LQG games.
1 Introduction
The controlled large-population (LP) or multi-agent (MA) systems have been widely applied in a variety
of fields including biology, engineering, operational research, mathematical finance and economics, social
science, etc. The most special feature of controlled LP system lies in the existence of considerable in-
significant agents whose dynamics and (or) cost functionals are coupled via the state-average across the
whole population. It is remarkable that the classical centralized strategies by consolidating all agent’s
exact states, turn out to be infeasible and ineffective due to the highly complicated coupling structure in
LP system. Alternatively, it is more tractable and effective to study the related decentralized strategies
by considering its own individual state and some off-line quantities only. Along this research line, one
important approach is the mean-field games (see e.g., [15]) which enables us to obtain the decentralized
strategies through the limiting auxiliary tracking problem and the related consistency condition. During
the last few decades, there has a growing literature to the study of mean-field games and their applica-
tions. The interested readers may refer the following partial list of recent works including [4,5,12–14,16]
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for mean-field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) games of large-population system, [11] for mean-field
games with major and minor players, [23] for risk-sensitive mean-field games. In addition, the stochastic
control problems with a mean-field term in dynamics and cost functional can be found in [1,6,18,28] etc.
It is remarkable that the individual states in above mentioned literature, are all formulated by (for-
ward) stochastic differential equations (SDEs) with prescribed initial condition only. In contrast, this
paper investigates the dynamic optimizations of LP system where the individual states are governed by
forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). Unlike the SDEs with forward state only,
the solution structure of FBSDEs consists of three components: the forward state xt with given initial
condition and the backward state pair (yt, zt) with pre-specified terminal condition. In particular, the
second backward component zt is actually necessary to achieve the terminal condition and ensure the
adapted solution due to martingale representation. The FBSDEs have been extensively discussed in
academic literature. The reader is referred to [3, 7, 21, 22, 25, 27, 31] for motivations and backgrounds of
FBSDE. The forward-backward large population dynamic optimization problems arise naturally in many
practical situations. One typical situation is when we consider the collective behaviors of many small
agents which have the nonlinear expectation or recursive utilities (e.g., [17]). Another typical situation
is from the large population system with constrained terminal condition (see e.g., [8]).
To our knowledge, this paper is the first try to formulate the large-population dynamic optimizations
in forward-backward setting, and to investigate the related mean-field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG)
games. Here, the forward-backward large-population system under consideration is partially coupled in
which the forward state does not explicitly depend on the backward states. The decentralized control
policy is derived from the consistency condition and the approximation scheme. The ǫ-Nash equilibrium
property is also verified. A simple summary to the novelties of our work is as follows. (i) Our individ-
ual states follow the forward-backward system with initial and terminal conditions; (ii) the decoupling
procedure involves six Riccati and force rate equations for Hamiltonian system; (iii) the initial and ter-
minal condition in Hamiltonian system is in the “mixed” sense (see [29]); (iv) the verification of ǫ-Nash
equilibrium applies the estimates of forward-backward system. In addition, the information structure of
forward-backward LP system is different to forward LP system due to the adaptiveness requirement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the large population LQG
games of forward-backward systems. Section 3 aims to study the optimal control of auxiliary track
system. The NCE consistency conditions are derived in Section 4. In Section 5, we obtain the ǫ-Nash
equilibrium property of our original problem. Section 6 concludes our work.
2 Problem formulation
Throughout this paper, we denote by Rm the m-dimensional Euclidean space. For a given Euclidean
space, denote by | · | its norm. Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for a fixed T > 0. Suppose
(Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T , P ) is a complete filtered probability space on which a standard N -dimensional Brow-
nian motion {Wi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}0≤t≤T is defined. Denote by {Fwit }0≤t≤T the filtration generated
by {Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. For a given filtration {Gt}0≤t≤T , let L2Gt(0, T ;Rm) denote the space of all Gt-
progressively measurable processes with values in Rm satisfying E
∫ T
0
|x(t)|2dt < +∞; L2(0, T ;Rm) the
space of all deterministic functions defined on [0, T ] in Rm satisfying
∫ T
0
|x(t)|2dt < +∞; C(0, T ;Rm) the
space of all continuous functions defined on [0, T ] in Rm. For notational simplicity, in what follows we
focus on the case where all processes are 1-dimensional.
Consider a large-population system with N individual agents, denoted by {Ai}1≤i≤N . The dynamics
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for individual agent involves three components. The forward components {xi}1≤i≤N of {Ai}1≤i≤N satisfy{
dxi(t) =
(
Axi(t) +Bui(t) + Fx
(N)(t)
)
dt+ σxi(t)dWi(t),
xi(0) =xi0
(1a)
where {xi0}Ni=1 are initial conditions of the forward system (1a), and the backward states are

−dyi(t) =
(
Cyi(t) +Dui(t) +Hxi(t) + Lx
(N)(t)
)
dt−
N∑
j=1
zij(t)dWj(t),
yi(T ) =Kxi(T )
(1b)
where x(N)(t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi(t) is the (forward) state-average. Here, A,B, F,C,D,H,L,K, σ are scalar con-
stants. Equation (1a) and (1b) together become a partially-coupled FBSDE, referred by (1) hereafter.
By “partially-coupled”, we mean the dynamics of forward state does not depend on the backward com-
ponents. Introduce Ft , σ{Wi(s), xi0; 0 ≤ s ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} as the full information accessible to the
LP system up to time t. Different to forward LP system, the backward diffusion term
∑N
j=1 zij(t)dWj(t)
driving by all Brownian motions (notWi only), should be introduced in the dynamics of Ai by considering
x
(N)
t ∈ Ft (even through Eq.(1a), the forward state of Ai is only driven by Wi only). The admissible
control ui ∈ Ui where the admissible set Ui satisfies
Ui ,
{
ui|ui(t) ∈ L2Ft(0, T ;R)
}
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Let u = (u1, · · · , uN) denote the set of control strategies of allN agents; u−i = (u1, · · · , ui−1, ui+1, · · ·uN)
the control strategies except ith agent Ai. The individual cost functional is given by
Ji(ui(·), u−i(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q
(
xi(t)−
(
Sx(N)(t) + η
))2
+Ru2i (t)
]
dt+N0y
2
i (0)
}
(2)
where S, η are scalar constants and Q ≥ 0, R > 0, N0 ≥ 0.
Remark 2.1 Unlike the forward LP literature, the new term of backward state N0y
2
i (0) is introduced in
(2) to denote some recursive evaluation or nonlinear expectation. One practical meaning of it is the initial
hedging deposits in the pension fund industry. In addition, one explanation of above forward-backward
system (1a) and (1b) is as follows: the forward state xi in (1a) represents some underlying asset/product
dynamics while the state-average x(N)(t) denotes some average market index on it; the backward state
yi denotes the dynamics of some derivative asset on xi (for example, the option on real product such as
raw-oil). In this case, (2) implies the minimization of the average deviation from market price, and the
initial hedging cost for some future commitment at the same time.
We introduce the following assumption:
(H1) {xi0}Ni=1 are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with E|xi0|2 < +∞, and also indepen-
dent of {Wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}.
Now, we formulate the large-population dynamic optimization problem.
Problem (I). Find a control strategies set u¯ = (u¯1, · · · , u¯N) which satisfies
Ji(u¯i(·), u¯−i(·)) = inf
ui∈Ui
Ji(ui(·), u¯−i(·))
where u¯−i represents (u¯1, · · · , u¯i−1, u¯i+1, · · · , u¯N ).
3
3 The Limiting Control Problem
To study Problem (I), one efficient approach is to discuss the associated mean-field games via limiting
problem when the agent number N tends to infinity. As N −→ +∞, suppose x(N) can be approximated
by a deterministic function x¯ and introduce the following auxiliary (forward) state dynamics{
dxi(t) =
(
Axi(t) +Bui(t) + F x¯(t)
)
dt+ σxi(t)dWi(t),
xi(0) =xi0
(3a)
and {
−dyi(t) =
(
Cyi(t) +Dui(t) +Hxi(t) + Lx¯(t)
)
dt− zi(t)dWi(t),
yi(T ) =Kxi(T ).
(3b)
The associated limiting cost functional becomes
J¯i(ui(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q
(
xi(t)−
(
Sx¯(t) + η
))2
+Ru2i (t)
]
dt+N0y
2
i (0)
}
. (4)
Thus, we formulate the limiting LQG game (II) as follows.
Problem (II). For the ith agent Ai, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, find u¯i ∈ Ui satisfying
J¯i(u¯i(·)) = inf
ui∈Ui
J¯i(ui(·)). (5)
u¯i satisfying (5) is called an optimal control for (II). Applying the standard variational method, we have:
Lemma 3.1 Under (H1), the optimal control for Problem (II) is given by
u¯i(t) = R
−1(Dkˆi(t)−Bpˆi(t)) (6)
where the adjoint process (kˆi, pˆi, qˆi) and the optimal trajectory (xˆi, yˆi, zˆi) satisfy the forward SDE

dxˆi(t) =
(
Axˆi(t) +R
−1BDkˆi(t)−R−1B2pˆi(t) + F x¯(t)
)
dt+ σxˆi(t)dWi(t),
xˆi(0) =xi0,
dkˆi(t) =Ckˆi(t)dt,
kˆi(0) =−N0yˆi(0)
(7a)
and backward SDE (BSDE)

−dyˆi(t) =
(
Cyˆi(t) +R
−1D2kˆi(t)−R−1BDpˆi(t) +Hxˆi(t) + Lx¯(t)
)
dt− zˆi(t)dWi(t),
yˆi(T ) =Kxˆi(T ),
−dpˆi(t) =
(
Apˆi(t)−Hkˆi(t) +Qxˆi(t)−QSx¯(t)−Qη + qˆi(t)σT
)
dt− qˆi(t)dWi(t),
pˆi(T ) =−Kkˆi(T ).
(7b)
The proof is similar to that of [31]. In the following, we aim to decouple the FBSDE system (7). Let
β(t) be the unique solution of the Riccati equation

dβ(t)
dt
+
(
2A+ σ2
)
β(t) −R−1B2β2(t) +Q = 0,
β(T ) = 0,
(8)
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α(t) the unique solution of the ordinary differential equation (ODE)

dα(t)
dt
+
(
A+ C −R−1B2β(t))α(t) +R−1BDβ(t)−H = 0,
α(T ) = −K,
(9)
ζ(t) the unique solution of the ODE

dζ(t)
dt
+
(
A+ C −R−1B2β(t))ζ(t) − (R−1BDβ(t)−H) = 0,
ζ(T ) = K,
(10)
and ξ(t) the unique solution of the ODE

dξ(t)
dt
+ 2Cξ(t) +
(
R−1BD −R−1B2α(t))ζ(t) +R−1D2 −R−1BDα(t) = 0,
ξ(T ) = 0.
(11)
Introduce
pˆi(t) = α(t)kˆi(t) + β(t)xˆi(t) + γ(t), (12)
and
yˆi(t) = ξ(t)kˆi(t) + ζ(t)xˆi(t) + τ(t) (13)
where γ(t) and τ(t) are deterministic functions to be determined. By Itoˆ’s formula, it follows that (7b)
is equivalent to the following BSDEs

−dγ(t) =[(A−R−1B2β(t))γ(t) + (Fβ(t)−QS)x¯(t)−Qη]dt
− (qˆi(t)− σβ(t)xˆi(t))dWi(t),
γ(T ) =0
(14a)
and 

−dτ(t) =[Cτ(t) − (R−1B2ζ(t) +R−1BD)γ(t) + (Fζ(t) + L)x¯(t)]dt
− (zˆi(t)− σζ(t)xˆi(t))dWi(t),
τ(T ) =0.
(14b)
In terms of the existence and uniqueness of solutions of BSDEs (see [19]), (14) is equivalent to the
following equations 

dγ(t)
dt
+
(
A− R−1B2β(t))γ(t) + (Fβ(t) −QS)x¯(t)−Qη = 0,
γ(T ) = 0,
(15a)


dτ(t)
dt
+ Cτ(t) − (R−1B2ζ(t) +R−1BD)γ(t) + (Fζ(t) + L)x¯(t) = 0,
τ(T ) = 0,
(15b)
qˆi(t) = σβ(t)xˆi(t) (15c)
and
zˆi(t) = σζ(t)xˆi(t). (15d)
Note that both (15a) and (15b) are the ODEs. Letting t = 0 in (13), we have
yˆi(0) = ξ(0)kˆi(0) + ζ(0)xˆi(0) + τ(0). (16)
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From (7a), we know that
kˆi(0) = −N0yˆi(0) and xˆi(0) = xi0. (17)
Supposing 1 + ξ(0)N0 6= 0 and substituting (17) into (16) yield
yˆi(0) =
ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0)
1 + ξ(0)N0
. (18)
Then computing kˆi(t) in (7a), we obtain the unique solution
kˆi(t) = −
N0
(
ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0)
)
eCt
1 + ξ(0)N0
. (19)
Based on (6), (12) and (19), we can rewrite (6) and the first equation in (7a) as
u¯i(t) = −R−1Bβ(t)xˆi(t) +
(
R−1Bα(t)−R−1D)N0(ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0))eCt
1 + ξ(0)N0
−R−1Bγ(t) (20)
and 

dxˆi(t) =

(A−R−1B2β(t))xˆi(t) +
(
R−1B2α(t) −R−1BD
)
N0
(
ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0)
)
eCt
1 + ξ(0)N0
−R−1B2γ(t) + F x¯(t)
]
dt+ σxˆi(t)dWi(t),
xˆi(0) =xi0.
(21)
Equation (21) admits a unique solution xˆi(·), which together with (19) in turn determines unique solutions
pˆi(·) and yˆi(·) of equations (12) and (13), respectively. Meanwhile, qˆi(·) and zˆi(·) are uniquely determined
by (15c) and (15d), respectively.
Remark 3.1 From (8)-(11), (15a) and (15b), it follows that (β, α, ζ, ξ) is independent of the undeter-
mined limiting state-average x¯ whereas (γ, τ) depends on x¯.
Remark 3.2 It is required that 1 + ξ(0)N0 6= 0. One special case is that N0 = 0, and in this case, our
problem is reduced to the forward large population problem by considering system (21) only. On the
other hand, a direct calculation implies
ξ(0) =
∫ T
0
e2CvR−1
(− 2BDα(v) +B2α2(v) +D2)dv = ∫ T
0
e2CvR−1
(
Bα(v) −D)2dv ≥ 0.
Therefore, 1+ ξ(0)N0 6= 0 whenever N0 > 0. In summary, 1+ ξ(0)N0 6= 0 is always true provided N0 ≥ 0.
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4 The Consistency Condition System
For simplicity of presentation, we introduce the following notations
A(t) , A−R−1B2β(t),
Γts , e
∫
t
s
A(r)dr, t ≥ s,
Γ¯ , e
∫
T
0
|A(r)|dr,
Θ1(s) ,
(
R−1B2α(s) −R−1BD)N0
1 + ξ(0)N0
,
Θ2(s) , −
(
R−1B2ζ(s) +R−1BD
)
,
Θ3(s) , Fβ(s)−QS,
Θ4(s) , Fζ(s) + L,
Θ5(s) ,
(
R−1Bα(s)−R−1D)N0
1 + ξ(0)N0
,
Θ6(s) , R
−1BDβ(s)−H,
Θ¯i ,
∫ T
0
|Θi(s)|ds, i = 1, · · · , 4.
(22)
Note that the terms defined in (22) are not dependent on x¯(·). We present the following result.
Proposition 4.1 Assume A,B,Q are nonzero, then Θ¯i, i = 1, · · · , 4 is bounded.
Proof. Denote by A =
(
A+ σ
2
2 −B
2
R
−Q −A− σ22
)
, and λ =
√
(A+ σ
2
2 )
2 + B
2Q
R
as the positive eigenvalue
of A. Then we have
(
0 1
)
eAt
(
0
1
)
=
1
2λ
[(
λ−A− σ
2
2
)
eλt +
(
λ+A+
σ2
2
)
e−λt
]
> 0.
According to [17], we get the explicit expression of β(t) as follows
β(t) = −
[(
0 1
)
eA(T−t)
(
0
1
)]−1 (
0 1
)
eA(T−t)
(
1
0
)
= Q
(
e2λ(T−t) − 1)[(λ−A− σ2
2
)
e2λ(T−t) +
(
λ+ A+
σ2
2
)]−1 (23)
and we can see β′(t) < 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, for ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]
0 ≤ β(t) ≤ β(0) < Q+ R
B2
[
1 + (A+
1
2
σ2)2
]
.
Then we get
sup
0≤t≤T
|A(t)| = sup
0≤t≤T
|A−R−1B2β(t)| < 1 + |A|+ (A+ 1
2
σ2)2 + R−1B2Q
and
Γ¯ = e
∫
T
0
|A(r)|dr < e
[
1+|A|+(A+ 1
2
σ2)2+R−1B2Q
]
T .
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Based on (23), we can directly solve the ODEs (9)-(11) as follows


α(t) = −KeC(T−t)ΓTt +
∫ T
t
eC(v−t)ΓvtΘ6(v)dv,
ζ(t) = −α(t),
ξ(t) =
∫ T
t
e2C(v−t)
[(
R−1BD −R−1B2α(v))ζ(v) +R−1D2 −R−1BDα(v)]dv.
(24)
Thus, we obtain 

sup
0≤t≤T
|α(t)| = sup
0≤t≤T
|ζ(t)|
≤
[
|K|+ T
( |BD|Q
R
+
|D|
|B| [1 + (A+
1
2
σ2)2] + |H |
)]
· e
[
1+|A|+(A+ 1
2
σ2)2+|C|+R−1B2Q
]
T ,
R(1 + ξ(0)N0) = R+N0
∫ T
0
e2Cv(Bα(v) −D)2dv.
(25)
In addition, we get

Θ¯1 =
∫ T
0
N0|B||Bα(s) −D|
R+N0
∫ T
0 e
2Cv(Bα(v) −D)2dv
ds,
Θ¯2 =
∫ T
0
|B||Bα(s)−D|
R
ds,
Θ¯3 =
∫ T
0
|Fβ(s)−QS|ds ≤ T
(
|F |Q+ |F |R
B2
[1 + (A+
1
2
σ2)2] +Q|S|
)
,
Θ¯4 =
∫ T
0
|Fα(s)− L|ds
(26)
which yields the boundness of Θ¯i, i = 1, · · · , 4. The proof is completed. 
For the given deterministic continuous function x¯ defined on [0, T ], solving the ODEs (15a) and (15b),

γ(t) =
∫ T
t
Γvt
(
Θ3(v)x¯(v) −Qη
)
dv,
τ(t) =
∫ T
t
eC(r−t)Θ2(r)
(∫ T
r
Γvr
(
Θ3(v)x¯(v)−Qη
)
dv
)
dr +
∫ T
t
eC(r−t)Θ4(r)x¯(r)dr.
(27)
Now we can introduce the decentralized feedback strategy for Ai as follows:
u¯i(t) = −R−1Bβ(t)xi(t) +
(
ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0)
)
Θ5(t)e
Ct −R−1Bγ(t). (28)
Applying the decentralized control law (28) to Ai, its realized closed-loop state becomes

dxi(t) =
[
A(t)xi(t) +
(
ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0)
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct
−R−1B2γ(t) + Fx(N)(t)
]
dt+ σxi(t)dWi(t),
xi(0) = xi0
(29a)
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and 

−dyi(t) =
[
Cyi(t) +
(
H −R−1BDβ(t))xi(t) +D(ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0))Θ5(t)eCt
−R−1BDγ(t) + Lx(N)(t)
]
dt−
N∑
j=1
zij(t)dWj(t),
yi(T ) =Kxi(T ).
(29b)
Taking summation of the above N equations of (29a) and dividing by N , we get

dx(N)(t) =
[
A(t)x(N)(t) +
(
ζ(0)x
(N)
0 + τ(0)
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct
−R−1B2γ(t) + Fx(N)(t)
]
dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σxi(t)dWi(t),
x(N)(0) =x
(N)
0
(30)
where x(N)(t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi(t), x
(N)
0 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi0. On the other hand,
lim
N→+∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
σxi(s)dWi(s) = 0.
Letting N → +∞ and replacing x(N) by x¯, we obtain the following limiting system
 dx¯(t) =
[(
A(t) + F
)
x¯(t) +
(
ζ(0)x0 + τ(0)
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct −R−1B2γ(t)
]
dt,
x¯(0) = x0.
(31)
We call (27) and (31) the consistency condition system by which the limiting state-average process can
be determined through the fixed-point analysis, as discussed below. Solving the ODE (31) directly and
noting (24) and (27), we have
x¯(t) =x0Γ
t
0e
Ft +
∫ t
0
Γtse
F (t−s)x0Θ1(s)eCs ·KΓT0 eCTds
−
∫ t
0
Γtse
F (t−s)x0Θ1(s)eCsds ·
∫ T
0
eCrΓr0Θ6(r)dr
+
∫ t
0
Γtse
F (t−s)Θ1(s)eCsds ·
∫ T
0
eCrΘ2(r)
(∫ T
r
Γvr
(
Θ3(v)x¯(v)−Qη
)
dv
)
dr
+
∫ t
0
Γtse
F (t−s)Θ1(s)eCsds ·
∫ T
0
eCrΘ4(r)x¯(r)dr
−
∫ t
0
Γtse
F (t−s)R−1B2
(∫ T
s
Γvs
(
Θ3(v)x¯(v)−Qη
)
dv
)
ds
,(T x¯)(t).
(32)
Introduce the norm as follows: for any f(t) ∈ C(0, T ;R),
‖f(t)‖∞ , sup
0≤t≤T
|f(t)|.
To apply the contraction mapping, hereafter we introduce the following assumption:
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(H2) e(2|C|+|F |)T Γ¯2Θ¯1Θ¯2Θ¯3 + e(2|C|+|F |)T Γ¯Θ¯1Θ¯4 + e|F |TR−1B2T Γ¯2Θ¯3 < 1.
Then the following theorem is obtained.
Theorem 4.1 Under (H2), the map T : C(0, T ;R) → C(0, T ;R) described by (32) has a unique fixed
point. Moreover, the decentralized feedback strategy u¯i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N in (28) is uniquely determined .
Proof. For any x, y ∈ C(0, T ;R), we have∥∥(T x− T y)(t)∥∥∞
=
∥∥∥∥∥
∫ t
0
Γtse
F (t−s)Θ1(s)eCsds ·
∫ T
0
eCrΘ2(r)
[ ∫ T
r
ΓvrΘ3(v)
(
x(v) − y(v))dv
]
dr
+
∫ t
0
Γtse
F (t−s)Θ1(s)eCsds ·
∫ T
0
eCrΘ4(r)
(
x(r) − y(r))dr
−
∫ t
0
Γtse
F (t−s)R−1B2
(∫ T
s
ΓvsΘ3(v)
(
x(v)− y(v))dv
)
ds
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤∥∥x− y∥∥∞
(
e(2|C|+|F |)T Γ¯2Θ¯1Θ¯2Θ¯3 + e(2|C|+|F |)T Γ¯Θ¯1Θ¯4 + e|F |TR−1B2T Γ¯2Θ¯3
)
.
(33)
From (H2), T defined by (32) is a contraction and has a unique fixed point x¯ ∈ C(0, T ;R) which is
equivalently given by (31) and in turn uniquely determines γ and τ in (27). Meanwhile, the solutions γ
and τ to (15a) and (15b) are equivalently given by (27), respectively. Then u¯i is uniquely determined,
which completes the proof. 
Remark 4.1 (1) From Theorem 4.1, there exists a unique deterministic function x¯ in C(0, T ;R) to
approximate the state-average of forward system. In next section, we specify more details of their
difference when applying the system (31).
(2) The limit process x¯ in forward equation (31) only involves τ(0) and γ(t). On the other hand, (27)
satisfies the backward system (15a) and (15b) which actually depends on x¯. Thus (31) and (27) constitute
a forward-backward ordinary differential equation (FBODE) system. Here, we focus on the fixed point
analysis in Theorem 4.1 which provides one sufficient condition for the well-posedness of FBODE system
(31) and (27).
Remark 4.2 By Proposition 4.1, if R is large enough and |F | is small enough (it corresponds to the
weak-coupling of state-average, see e.g., [14]), we get that Θ¯1Θ¯2Θ¯3, Θ¯1Θ¯4 and R
−1Θ¯3 should be small
enough hence (H2) follows.
Remark 4.3 (1) One interesting special case is when N0 = 0 which corresponds to the forward large
population problem only. In this case, we have Θ¯1 = 0, and (H2) reads as below:
(H2)’ e|F |TR−1B2T Γ¯2Θ¯3 < 1
which is similar to that of [12] but noting our diffusion term in (1a) depends on state itself while in [12]
the diffusion term is constant. In addition, different to (H2), (H2)’ does not depend on C. This is because
the dynamic system in this case is irrelevant with the backward one.
(2) Another interesting special case is when N0 > 0 but Q = 0. In this case, the cost functional
becomes
Ji(ui(·), u−i(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
Ru2i (t)dt+N0y
2
i (0)
}
which takes into account the initial hedging cost via N0y
2
i (0), and we have β(t) ≡ 0 and thus Θ¯3 = 0.
Now (H2) reads as follows
(H2)” e(2|C|+|F |)T Γ¯Θ¯1Θ¯4 < 1.
10
To get a more clear result, further assume H = K = 0, AC 6= 0, A ± C 6= 0. In this case, we have
A(t) ≡ A, Γts = eA(t−s), Γ¯ = e|A|T , Θ6(t) ≡ 0 and α(t) ≡ 0. Then we obtain∫ T
0
e2Cv
(
Bα(v) −D)2dv = D2
2C
(e2CT − 1),
Θ¯1 =
2C|B||D|N0T
2CR+D2N0(e2CT − 1) ,
Θ¯4 = |L|T.
Thus, (H2)” implies
2C|B||D||L|N0T 2
2CR+D2N0(e2CT − 1)e
(|A|+2|C|+|F |)T < 1.
5 ǫ-Nash Equilibrium Analysis
In above sections, we obtained the optimal control u¯i(·), 1 ≤ i ≤ N of Problem (II) through the consis-
tency condition system. Now we turn to verify the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of Problem (I). Due to its own
forward-backward structure, our analysis here is not simple extension of that in the forward LP system.
More details are as follows. To start, we first present the definition of ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 5.1 A set of controls uk ∈ Uk, 1 ≤ k ≤ N, for N agents is called to satisfy an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium with respect to the costs Jk, 1 ≤ k ≤ N, if there exists ǫ ≥ 0 such that for any fixed
1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have
Ji(ui, u−i) ≤ Ji(u′i, u−i) + ǫ (34)
when any alternative control u′i ∈ Ui is applied by Ai.
Now, we state the following result and its proof will be given later.
Theorem 5.1 Under (H1)-(H2), (u˜1, u˜2, · · · , u˜N ) in Problem (I) satisfies the ǫ-Nash equilibrium where,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, u˜i is given by
u˜i(t) = −R−1Bβ(t)x˜i(t) +
(
ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0)
)
Θ5(t)e
Ct −R−1Bγ(t) (35)
for x˜i(·) satisfying (29a), the decentralized state trajectory for Ai.
The proof of above theorem needs several lemmas which are presented later. We first introduce the
optimal control and state of auxiliary limiting system as
u¯i(t) = −R−1Bβ(t)xˆi(t) +
(
ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0)
)
Θ5(t)e
Ct −R−1Bγ(t).
Note that {u˜i(·)}Ni=1 are different from {u¯i(·)}Ni=1, as x˜i(·) differs from xˆi(·) which is the decentralized
state of auxiliary system. Applying u˜i(·) for Ai, we have the following close-loop system

dx˜i(t) =
[
A(t)x˜i(t) +
(
ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0)
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct
−R−1B2γ(t) + F x˜(N)(t)
]
dt+ σx˜i(t)dWi(t),
x˜i(0) =xi0
(36a)
and 

−dy˜i(t) =
[
Cy˜i(t) +
(
H −R−1BDβ(t))x˜i(t) +D(ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0))Θ5(t)eCt
−R−1BDγ(t) + Lx˜(N)(t)
]
dt−
N∑
j=1
z˜ij(t)dWj(t),
y˜i(T ) =Kx˜i(T )
(36b)
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with the cost functional
Ji(u˜i(·), u˜−i(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q
(
x˜i(t)−
(
Sx˜(N)(t) + η
))2
+Ru˜2i (t)
]
dt+N0y˜
2
i (0)
}
(36c)
where x˜(N)(t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
x˜i(t). The auxiliary system (of limiting problem) is given by


dxˆi(t) =
[
A(t)xˆi(t) +
(
ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0)
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct
−R−1B2γ(t) + F x¯(t)
]
dt+ σxˆi(t)dWi(t),
xˆi(0) =xi0
(37a)
and 

−dyˆi(t) =
[
Cyˆi(t) +
(
H −R−1BDβ(t))xˆi(t) +D(ζ(0)xi0 + τ(0))Θ5(t)eCt
−R−1BDγ(t) + Lx¯(t)
]
dt− zˆi(t)dWi(t),
yˆi(T ) =Kxˆi(T )
(37b)
with the cost functional
J¯i(u¯i(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q
(
xˆi(t)−
(
Sx¯(t) + η
))2
+Ru¯2i (t)
]
dt+N0yˆ
2
i (0)
}
. (37c)
We have
Lemma 5.1
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
. (38)
Proof. By (36a), we have

dx˜(N)(t) =
[(
A(t) + F
)
x˜(N)(t) +
(
ζ(0)x
(N)
0 + τ(0)
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct −R−1B2γ(t)
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σx˜i(t)dWi(t),
x˜(N)(0) =x
(N)
0
where x
(N)
0 is given in (30). Noting (31), we get

d
(
x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t)
)
=
[(
A(t) + F
)(
x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t))+ ζ(0)Θ1(t)eCt(x(N)0 − x0)]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σx˜i(t)dWi(t),
x˜(N)(0)− x¯(0) =x(N)0 − x0.
(39)
Thus ∣∣∣x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t)∣∣∣2 ≤3∣∣∣x(N)0 − x0∣∣∣2 + 6t
∫ t
0
(∣∣∣A(s) + F ∣∣∣2∣∣∣x˜(N)(s)− x¯(s)∣∣∣2
+
∣∣∣ζ(0)Θ1(s)eCs∣∣∣2∣∣∣x(N)0 − x0∣∣∣2)ds+ 3∣∣∣
∫ t
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
σx˜i(s)dWi(s)
∣∣∣2.
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By (H1), we have
E
∣∣∣x(N)0 − x0∣∣∣2 = E∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
xi0 − x0
∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
.
Noting sup
0≤t≤T
Ex˜2i (t) < +∞, we have
E
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
σx˜i(s)dWi(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= O
( 1
N
)
.
So (38) follows by Gronwall’s inequality. 
Considering the difference between the decentralized and centralized states and controls, we have the
following estimates:
Lemma 5.2
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣x˜i(t)− xˆi(t)∣∣∣2
]
= O
( 1
N
)
, (40)
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣u˜i(t)− u¯i(t)∣∣∣2
]
= O
( 1
N
)
, (41)
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣y˜i(t)− yˆi(t)∣∣∣2
]
= O
( 1
N
)
. (42)
Proof. For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, by (36a) and (37a), we get
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣x˜i(t)− xˆi(t)∣∣∣2 ≤3[T ‖A(t)‖2∞ + σ2]
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣x˜i(s)− xˆi(s)∣∣∣2ds
+ 3T |F |2
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣x˜(N)(s)− x¯(s)∣∣∣2ds.
Then (40) follows from Lemma 5.1. Noting the difference between u˜i(·) and u¯i(·), (41) is obtained by
(40). From (36b) and (37b), we have

−d
(
y˜i(t)− yˆi(t)
)
=
[
C
(
y˜i(t)− yˆi(t)
)
+
(
H −R−1BDβ(t))(x˜i(t)− xˆi(t))
+ L
(
x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t))]dt− (z˜ii(t)− zˆi(t))dWi(t)
−
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
z˜ij(t)dWj(t),
y˜i(T )− yˆi(T ) =K
(
x˜i(T )− xˆi(T )
)
.
(43)
Applying the basic estimate of BSDE, we get
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣y˜i(t)− yˆi(t)∣∣∣2
]
+ E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣z˜ii(t)− zˆi(t)∣∣∣2dt+ N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣z˜ij(t)∣∣∣2dt
≤C1
{
E
∣∣∣x˜i(T )− xˆi(T )∣∣∣2 + E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣H −R−1BDβ(t)∣∣∣2∣∣∣x˜i(t)− xˆi(t)∣∣∣2dt
+E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t)∣∣∣2dt
}
,
where C1 is a positive constant. Thus, we get (42) by Lemma 5.1 and (40). 
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Lemma 5.3 For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, ∣∣∣Ji(u˜i, u˜−i)− J¯i(u¯i)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
. (44)
Proof. For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, by (31) and (37a), we easily get sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˆi(t)− (Sx¯(t) + η)∣∣2 < +∞. Applying
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣∣∣x˜i(t)− (Sx˜(N)(t) + η)∣∣2 − ∣∣xˆi(t)− (Sx¯(t) + η)∣∣2∣∣∣
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣x˜i(t)− (Sx˜(N)(t) + η)− xˆi(t) + (Sx¯(t) + η)∣∣2
+ 2 sup
0≤t≤T
E
[∣∣xˆi(t)− (Sx¯(t) + η)∣∣∣∣x˜i(t)− (Sx˜(N)(t) + η)− xˆi(t) + (Sx¯(t) + η)∣∣]
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣x˜i(t)− xˆi(t)− S(x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t))∣∣2
+ 2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˆi(t)− (Sx¯(t) + η)∣∣2) 12( sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣x˜i(t)− xˆi(t)− S(x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t))∣∣2) 12
=O
( 1√
N
)
where the last equality is obtained by using the fact
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣x˜i(t)− xˆi(t)− S(x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t))∣∣2 ≤ 2 sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣x˜i(t)− xˆi(t)∣∣2 + 2S2 sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t)∣∣2
and Lemma 5.1, 5.2. Similarly, by (41) and (42), we get
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣∣∣u˜i(t)∣∣2 − ∣∣u¯i(t)∣∣2∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
,
and
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣∣∣y˜i(t)∣∣2 − ∣∣yˆi(t)∣∣2∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
.
Further,
E
∣∣∣∣∣y˜i(0)∣∣2 − ∣∣yˆi(0)∣∣2∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
.
Then ∣∣∣Ji(u˜i, u˜−i)− J¯i(u¯i)∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
Q
∣∣∣(x˜i(t)− (Sx˜(N)(t) + η))2 − (xˆi(t)− (Sx¯(t) + η))2∣∣∣+R∣∣∣u˜2i (t)− u¯2i (t)∣∣∣
]
dt
+
1
2
N0E
∣∣∣y˜2i (0)− yˆ2i (0)∣∣∣
=O
( 1√
N
)
,
which completes the proof. 
Now, we already present some estimates of states and costs corresponding to control u˜i and u¯i,1 ≤
i ≤ N . Our next work is to prove that the control strategies set (u˜1, u˜2, · · · , u˜N) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
for (I). For any fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , consider a perturbed control ui ∈ Ui for Ai and introduce
 dli(t) =
[
Ali(t) +Bui(t) + Fl
(N)(t)
]
dt+ σli(t)dWi(t),
li(0) =xi0
(45a)
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whereas other agents keep the control u˜j , 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i, i.e.,

dlj(t) =
[
A(t)lj(t) +
(
ζ(0)xj0 + τ(0)
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct
−R−1B2γ(t) + Fl(N)(t)
]
dt+ σlj(t)dWj(t),
lj(0) =xj0
(45b)
where l(N)(t) = 1
N
N∑
k=1
lk(t). Similar to the forward system, the backward system is introduced as


−dmi(t) =
[
Cmi(t) +Dui(t) +Hli(t) + Ll
(N)(t)
]
dt−
N∑
k=1
nik(t)dWk(t),
mi(T ) =Kli(T )
(45c)
while for j 6= i,

−dmj(t) =
[
Cmj(t) +
(
H −R−1BDβ(t))lj(t) +D(ζ(0)xj0 + τ(0))Θ5(t)eCt
−R−1BDγ(t) + Ll(N)(t)
]
dt−
N∑
k=1
njk(t)dWk(t),
mj(T ) =Klj(T ).
(45d)
If u˜i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to cost Ji, it holds that
Ji(u˜i, u˜−i) ≥ inf
ui∈Ui
Ji(ui, u˜−i) ≥ Ji(u˜i, u˜−i)− ǫ.
Then, when making the perturbation, we just need to consider ui ∈ Ui such that Ji(ui, u˜−i) ≤ Ji(u˜i, u˜−i),
which implies
1
2
E
∫ T
0
Ru2i (t)dt ≤ Ji(ui, u˜−i) ≤ Ji(u˜i, u˜−i) = J¯i(u¯i) +O
( 1√
N
)
,
i.e.,
E
∫ T
0
u2i (t)dt ≤ C2 (46)
where C2 is a positive constant which is independent of N . Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1 sup
1≤j≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣lj(t)∣∣2
]
is bounded.
Proof. By (45a) and (45b), it holds that
|li(t)|2 ≤C3
{
|xi0|2 +
∫ t
0
[
|li(s)|2 + |ui(s)|2 + 1
N
N∑
k=1
|lk(s)|2
]
ds+
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
σli(s)dWi(s)
∣∣∣2
}
and for j 6= i,
|lj(t)|2 ≤C3
{
|xj0|2 +
∫ t
0
[
|lj(s)|2 + |u˜j(s)|2 + 1
N
N∑
k=1
|lk(s)|2
]
ds+
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
σlj(s)dWj(s)
∣∣∣2
}
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where C3 is a positive constant. Thus,
E
[ N∑
k=1
|lk(t)|2
]
≤C3

E
[ N∑
k=1
|xk0|2
]
+ E
∫ t
0
[ N∑
k=1
|lk(s)|2 + |ui(s)|2 +
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
|u˜k(s)|2
+
N∑
k=1
|lk(s)|2
]
ds+
N∑
k=1
E
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
σlk(s)dWk(s)
∣∣∣2
}
≤C3
{
N∑
k=1
E|xk0|2 +
∫ t
0
[
2
N∑
k=1
E|lk(s)|2 + E|ui(s)|2
+
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
E|u˜k(s)|2
]
ds+
∫ t
0
N∑
k=1
E|lk(s)|2ds

 .
By (46), we can see that ui(·) is L2-bounded. Besides, the decentralized optimal controls u˜k(·), k 6= i are
L2-bounded. Then by Gronwall’s inequality, it follows that
sup
0≤t≤T
E
[
N∑
k=1
|lk(t)|2
]
= O(N),
and for any 1 ≤ j ≤ N, sup
0≤t≤T
E|lj(t)|2 is bounded. 
Correspondingly, the system for agent Ai under control ui in (II) is as follows
 dl
0
i (t) =
[
Al0i (t) +Bui(t) + F x¯(t)
]
dt+ σl0i (t)dWi(t),
l0i (0) =xi0
(47a)
and for agent Aj , j 6= i, 

dlˆj(t) =
[
A(t)lˆj(t) +
(
ζ(0)xj0 + τ(0)
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct
−R−1B2γ(t) + F x¯(t)
]
dt+ σlˆj(t)dWj(t),
lˆj(0) =xj0
(47b)
coupled with the backward systems
−dm
0
i (t) =
[
Cm0i (t) +Dui(t) +Hl
0
i (t) + Lx¯(t)
]
dt− n0i (t)dWi(t),
m0i (T ) =Kl
0
i (T )
(47c)
for j 6= i, 

−dmˆj(t) =
[
Cmˆj(t) +
(
H −R−1BDβ(t))lˆj(t) +D(ζ(0)xj0 + τ(0))Θ5(t)eCt
−R−1BDγ(t) + Lx¯(t)
]
dt− nˆj(t)dWj(t),
mˆj(T ) =Klˆj(T ).
(47d)
In order to give necessary estimates in Problem (I) and (II), we introduce the intermediate states as

dlˇi(t) =
[
Alˇi(t) +Bui(t) +
N − 1
N
F lˇ(N−1)(t)
]
dt+ σlˇi(t)dWi(t),
lˇi(0) =xi0
(48a)
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and for j 6= i, 

dlˇj(t) =
[
A(t)lˇj(t) +
(
ζ(0)xj0 + τ(0)
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct
−R−1B2γ(t) + N − 1
N
F lˇ(N−1)(t)
]
dt+ σlˇj(t)dWj(t),
lˇj(0) =xj0
(48b)
where lˇ(N−1)(t) = 1
N−1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
lˇj(t). Denoting l
(N−1)(t) = 1
N−1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
lj(t), by (45b) and (48b), we get


dl(N−1)(t) =
[(
A(t) +
N − 1
N
F
)
l(N−1)(t) +
(
ζ(0)x
(N−1)
0 + τ(0)
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct
−R−1B2γ(t) + F
N
li(t)
]
dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σlj(t)dWj(t),
l(N−1)(0) =x(N−1)0
(49a)
and 

dlˇ(N−1)(t) =
[(
A(t) +
N − 1
N
F
)
lˇ(N−1)(t) +
(
ζ(0)x
(N−1)
0 + τ(0)
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct
−R−1B2γ(t)
]
dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σlˇj(t)dWj(t),
lˇ(N−1)(0) =x(N−1)0
(49b)
where x
(N−1)
0 =
1
N−1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
xj0. We have the following estimates on these states.
Proposition 5.2
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣l(N−1)(t)− lˇ(N−1)(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
, (50)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣l(N)(t)− l(N−1)(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
, (51)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣lˇ(N−1)(t)− x¯(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
. (52)
Proof. By (49), we have

d
(
l(N−1)(t)− lˇ(N−1)(t)
)
=
[(
A(t) +
N − 1
N
F
)(
l(N−1)(t)− lˇ(N−1)(t)) + F
N
li(t)
]
dt
+
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σ
(
lj(t) − lˇj(t)
)
dWj(t),
l(N−1)(0)− lˇ(N−1)(0) =0.
Then by Proposition 5.1 and Gronwall’s inequality, the assertion (50) holds. (51) follows from assumption
(H2) and the L2-boundness of controls ui(·) and u˜j(·), j 6= i. From (31) and (49b), we get

d
(
lˇ(N−1)(t)− x¯(t)
)
=
[(
A(t) +
N − 1
N
F
)(
lˇ(N−1)(t)− x¯(t))− F
N
x¯(t)
+ ζ(0)
(
x
(N−1)
0 − x0
)
Θ1(t)e
Ct
]
dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σlˇj(t)dWj(t),
lˇ(N−1)(0)− x¯(0) =x(N−1)0 − x0.
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Thus, (52) is obtained. 
In addition, based on Proposition 5.2, we have
Lemma 5.4
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣l(N)(t)− x¯(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
, (53)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣li(t)− l0i (t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1N
)
, (54)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|mi(t)|2 − |m0i (t)|2∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
, (55)
∣∣∣Ji(ui, u˜−i)− J¯i(ui)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
. (56)
Proof. (53) follows from Proposition 5.2 directly. By (45a),(47a), and using (53), we get (54). Noting
(45c) and (47c), we have


−d
(
mi(t)−m0i (t)
)
=
[
C
(
mi(t)−m0i (t)
)
+H
(
li(t)− l0i (t)
)
+ L
(
l(N)(t)− x¯(t))]dt
− (nii(t)− n0i (t))dWi(t)− N∑
k=1,k 6=i
nik(t)dWk(t),
mi(T )−m0i (T ) =K
(
li(T )− l0i (T )
)
Applying the estimate of BSDE, we get
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣mi(t)−m0i (t)∣∣∣2
]
+ E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣nii(t)− n0i (t)∣∣∣2dt+
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣nik(t)∣∣∣2dt
≤C4
{
E
∣∣∣li(T )− l0i (T )∣∣∣2 + E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣li(t)− l0i (t)∣∣∣2dt+ E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣l(N)(t)− x¯(t)∣∣∣2dt
}
.
Then by (53) and (54), we have
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣mi(t)−m0i (t)∣∣∣2
]
= O
( 1
N
)
.
We can see that both sup
0≤t≤T
E|m0i (t)|2 and sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣l0i (t)−(Sx¯(t)+η)∣∣2 are bounded. Similar to the proof
in Lemma 5.3, we get
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|mi(t)|2 − |m0i (t)|2∣∣∣
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E|mi(t)−m0i (t)|2 + 2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E|m0i (t)|2
) 1
2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E|mi(t)−m0i (t)|2
) 1
2
=O
( 1√
N
)
,
which is (55). Further, we have
E
∣∣∣|mi(0)|2 − |m0i (0)|2∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
.
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Moreover,
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣∣(li(t)− (Sl(N)(t) + η))2 − (l0i (t)− (Sx¯(t) + η))2
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣li(t)− l0i (t)− S(l(N)(t)− x¯(t))∣∣∣2
+ 2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣l0i (t)− (Sx¯(t) + η)∣∣2) 12( sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣li(t)− l0i (t)− S(l(N)(t)− x¯(t))∣∣2) 12
=O
( 1√
N
)
,
then ∣∣∣Ji(ui, u˜−i)− J¯i(ui)∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
E
∫ T
0
Q
∣∣∣(li(t)− (Sl(N)(t) + η))2 − (l0i (t)− (Sx¯(t) + η))2∣∣∣dt
+
1
2
N0E
∣∣∣m2i (0)− (m0i (0))2∣∣∣
=O
( 1√
N
)
which implies (56). 
Proof of Theorem 5.1: Now, we consider the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for Ai. Combining Lemma 5.3 and
5.4, we have
Ji(u˜i, u˜−i) = J¯i(u¯i) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ J¯i(ui) +O
( 1√
N
)
= Ji(ui, u˜−i) +O
( 1√
N
)
.
Thus, Theorem 5.1 follows by taking ǫ = O
(
1√
N
)
.
6 Conclusions
This paper discusses the large-population (LP) LQG games with forward-backward structure. The de-
centralized control is derived based on the consistency condition. The ǫ-Nash equilibrium property is
also verified based on the estimates of forward-backward stochastic systems. The current work also sug-
gests some research directions for future studies. One possible direction is to investigate the fully coupled
forward-backward mean-field LQG games where the forward state dynamics involves the backward states.
Another direction is to study the mean-field LQG games which include the backward state average.
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